"Chatterboxes" and Other Stereotyped Representations of Mobile Phone Users

Abstract: In the context of an international research project on older people’s relations with and through mobile telephony, Italian participants spontaneously provided narrations on mobile phones that appeared to be structured around strong stereotypes. Respondents show a twofold representation of mobile phones either as a simple communication tool or as a ‘hi-tech’ device, which generates multifaceted stereotypes. 

More specifically, when the mobile phone is considered as a simple communication tool, age-based stereotypes address younger people’s bad manners, while gendered stereotypes depict women as ‘chatterboxes’ or ‘social groomers’. On the other hand, when the mobile phone is considered a ‘hi-tech’ device, age-based stereotypes underline younger people’s advanced user skills, while gendered stereotypes focus on women’s lack of competencies. Based on that, we provide a conceptual framework for analysing such stereotyped – and apparently conflicting – representations. Interestingly, while some issues also emerged in other countries, the masculine assumption that women are less-skilled mobile phone users appears as a peculiarity of Italian respondents. (Comunello et al., 2016)

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- Comunello, F., Fernandez Ardevol, M., Mulargia, S. & Belotti, F. (2016). Women, youth and everything else: age-based and gendered stereotypes in relation to digital technology among elderly Italian mobile phone users. Media, Culture & Society, 39(6), link

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Gender Dysphoria

Some transgender persons may experience "gender dysphoria" which refers to the "psychological distress that results from an incongruence between one's sex assigned at birth and one's gender identity". Gender dysphoria often starts in childhood, some experience it after puberty or many years later.

The DSM-5-TR defines gender dysphoria as an incongruence between one’s experienced gender and their assigned gender. It lasts at least six months and is manifested by at least two of the following criteria: 

A marked incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed gender and primary and/or secondary sex characteristics (or in young adolescents, the anticipated secondary sex characteristics) 

A strong desire to be rid of one’s primary and/or secondary sex characteristics because of a marked incongruence with one’s experienced/expressed gender (or in young adolescents, a desire to prevent the development of the anticipated secondary sex characteristics) 

A strong desire for the primary and/or secondary sex characteristics of the other gender 

A strong desire to be of the other gender (or some alternative gender different from one’s assigned gender) 

A strong desire to be treated as the other gender (or some alternative gender different from one’s assigned gender) 

A strong conviction that one has the typical feelings and reactions of the other gender (or some alternative gender different from one’s assigned gender) (literally via).

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photograph by Bruce Gilden via

Self-Regulation of Prejudiced Responses. Excerpts.

"Experiment 1 examined subjects' reactions to rejecting a lawschool applicant because of his sexual orientation. This was a discrepant response for both low and high prejudiced subjects. However, the response violated low prejudiced, well-internalized standards for low prejudiced subjects only, so that the discrepancy was larger and more personally significant for low than for high prejudiced subjects. The central question was whether low prejudiced subjects experiencing such a discrepancy would manifest evidence of the engagement of self-regulatory mechanisms that, theoretically, should facilitate the subsequent inhibition of discrepant responses. The results provided clear, converging evidence that the discrepancy experience did engage these self-regulatory mechanisms."



"First, the discrepancy experience produced negative self-directed affect among low but not high prejudiced subjects. Theoretically, such guilty feelings should motivate discrepancy reduction (e.g., Rokeach, 1973) and should serve to establishstrong cues for punishment (cf. Gray, 1982). Second, the discrepancy experience heightened low but not high prejudiced subjects' self-focus. This finding is consistent with Pyszczynskiand Greenberg's (1986,1987) contention that ego-relevant discrepancies increase self-focus, which promotes subsequent regulation of behavior. Further examination of the self-thoughts provided a third indicator of the activation of self-regulatory mechanisms: Low prejudiced subjects in the discrepancy-activated condition were uniquely preoccupied with their personal prejudice-related discrepancy experiences. In fact, over half of their self-thoughts were focused on such discrepancies. Finally,the low prejudiced, discrepancy-activated subjects appeared to attend carefully to discrepancy-relevant information. They spent significantly more time reading the essay than their not-activated counterparts, whereas this difference was not significant for the high prejudiced subjects. The low prejudiced, discrepancy-activated subjects also showed superior recall for the portion of the essay concerning why prejudice-related discrepancies arise. Theoretically, the enhanced attention to discrepancy-relevant information and the heightened attention to personal discrepancy experiences should help low prejudiced individuals eventually gain control over their discrepant responses(see Gray, 1982)."

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- Monteith, M. (1993). Self-Regulation of Prejudiced Responses: Implications for Progress in Prejudice-Reduction Efforts. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65(3), 469-485.
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Prejudice. A Tripartite Conception.

Three components of prejudice are often mentioned: ignorance (arriving at a conclusion before considering facts), hostility (derogatory and hostile attitudes), externalisation (directed at others). Akhtar (2007) proposes an expanded definition since "this conventional tripod" is found "a bit wobbly".



Ignorance and ignoring are the centrepiece of prejudice's definition, however, the author argues, what constitutes a fact remains unclear "in these days of post-modern relativism" asking the question whether we should "restrict ourselves to external reality" or if "the facts in the internal, psychic reality matter as well". Limiting oneself to the former, though, does not mean that we are kept from using revisionist strategies and that sociopolitical interests "readily put a spin on available information to create suitable facts".
Hostility is true of most prejudices but they do not necessarily have to be negative and "naïve idealization is as much a manifestation of prejudice as is ignorant devaluation".
Externalisation of badness are projective mechanisms but they can also involve attitudes about oneself, i.e. turning the target of prejudice into the self (Akhtar, 2007).

Then there are the characterologically narcissistic situations of self-glorification in which a fatal denial of one's blemishes, hostility, and exploitativeness is evident. This too constitutes judgment withouth knowing the facts, though the facts here are mostly intrapsychic ones. On a large group level too, self-glorification occurs as a result of "robbing" a hated group of its good qualities and claiming them for oneself. Also involved here is a negation of the problematic aspects of one's own history. (...) One thing becomes clear in the end. Prejudice can be as easily directed at oneself as it is against others. This pertains to beoth its positive and negative forms, and is applicable to both individuals and groups.
This brief epistemological excursion demonstrates that prejudice can (1) occur in the presence of knowledge, (2) involve good feelings, and (3) be direced at oneself. 

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- Akhtar, S. (2007). From Unmentalized Xenophobia to Messianic Sadism: Some Reflections on the Phenomenology of Prejudice. In H. Parens, A. Mahfouz, S. W. Twemlow, & D. E. Scharff (eds.). The future of prejudice. Psychoanalysis and the prevention of prejudice (7-19). Lanham & Plymouth: Jason Aronson.
- photograph by Bruce Gilden (New Orleans Mardi Gras, 1982) via

Just Another Day

Buone feste ... I sincerely wished that those who celebrate Christmas today were not alone, particularly the aged.



"Nearly half of the older people surveyed for Age UK – equating to almost 5.7 million people aged-65 and over – feel their days can be repetitive, almost a quarter of whom (around 1.4 million older people) admitted that Christmas isn't a special day for them and just passes them by.



Based on the survey, the charity estimates that getting on towards a million (873,000) people aged 65 and over don't see or hear from someone for days on end over the festive period. And at Christmas time, on days when older people do not see or hear from anyone, over half (55%) rely on the TV for companionship."
Age UK

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photograph by Bruce Gilden via

The -ism Series (22): Collective Narcissism

"An inflated belief in one’s own superiority and the need of its constant recognition and validation by others are characteristic for narcissism. This narcissism is collective, rather than individual, when the beliefs concern a group. Thus, collective narcissism is defined as an emotional investment in a belief about the unparalleled greatness of one’s own group that is contingent on continuous validation from others."
Golec de Zavala et al. (n.d.)



Collective narcissism means favouring one's own group, an attitude that is often accompanied by hostility against other groups (Golec de Zavala, 2012). German sociologist, philosopher and musicologist Theodor W. Adorno (1903-1969) borrowed from Freud when analysing the phenomenon of Nazism and adopted his view that groups often act as a "negatively integrating force" since negative emotions towards "the other", out-groups such as people with a different religion or skin tone, offer a narcissistic gain for followers. Just belonging to the in-group makes them "better, higher, and purer than those who are excluded". Weak egos benefit from this mechanism as collective narcissism is the compensation for social powerlessness when members of the in-group turn themselves "either in fact or imagination to which they attribute qualities which they themselves lack and from which they profit by vicarious participation" (Cook, 2008). Another "advantage" is that people can be narcissistic about almost any social group they (feel they) belong to. In other words, there are a great many situations in which one can demonstrate collective narcissism (Golec de Zavala, 2012).



"(...) collective narcissism is exaggerated, but insecure, collective self-esteem. It consists of a very high regard for and glorification of the group. This is accompanied by a conviction that others do not appreciate the group’s greatness sufficiently and, consequently, treat it unfairly. Importantly, collective narcissism is related to self-reported, high esteem of the group accompanied by a lack of its positive regard on the implicit level: a level of automatic and uncontrolled evaluations that are not fully accessible to conscious reflection. In other words, collective narcissists, possibly, doubt the greatness of their group quite unconsciously. Even if they are aware of these doubts they do not acknowledge them. Instead, they report high certainty of their positive opinion about their group."
Golec de Zavala (2012)




- Cook, D. (2008) Theodor W. Adorno: an introduction. In Cook, D. (ed.) Theodor Adorno, 3-20, Key Concepts. New York: Routledge
- Golec de Zavala, A. (2012). Collective narcissism. In D. J. Christie (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Peace Psychology. Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Golec de Zavala, A., Cichocka, A. & Iskra-Golec, I. (n.d.) Collective Narcissism Moderates the Effect of In-group Image Threat on Intergroup Hostility. online
- photographs by Bruce Gilden via and via and via and via